Trump’s Return and the Shift in U.S.-Europe Relations
Less than two months have passed since Donald Trump returned to the White House, but he has already triggered a long list of dramatic changes in the United States and abroad. As the days go by, the magnitude of his impact on the world order becomes clearer, as he undermines an 80-year-old alliance with European countries that has existed since World War II. For decades, Europe has relied on U.S. military power—first against the Soviet Union during the Cold War and now against Vladimir Putin’s Russia, which seeks to restore its former glory.
Despite Trump’s pro-Russian stance and his baseless claim that Ukraine is responsible for the war Putin launched three years ago, Europe hopes Washington will continue to defend the continent and uphold its role as the backbone of NATO. However, European leaders are also preparing for the possibility that the United States may not come to their aid in the event of a Russian attack.
Europe’s Military Buildup and Poland’s Nuclear Considerations
This fear is pushing European nations to comply with Trump’s demand for increased defense spending. Last week, the European Commission unveiled an ambitious €800 billion plan to “rearm” Europe, after years of military neglect and shrinking armed forces. In a surprising statement on Friday, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced that his country would consider acquiring unconventional weapons, including nuclear arms—though he stopped short of explicitly stating that Poland intends to pursue them.
Trump has long been a vocal critic of Europe and NATO. During his first term, he repeatedly accused European leaders of failing to invest adequately in the alliance and “exploiting” the United States, NATO’s primary financial contributor. His criticism was not entirely unfounded, and the pressure he exerted led most member states to meet the minimum defense spending target of 2% of GDP, set a decade ago. Now, Trump is demanding even greater investment, recently suggesting that the target should be raised to 5% of GDP—despite the fact that the United States itself does not meet this threshold.
Last Thursday, Trump questioned the reliability of NATO allies.
“You know what the biggest problem I have with NATO is? I mean, I know these guys very well. They are my friends. But if the U.S. is in trouble, and we call them—we’ll say, ‘We have a problem, France. We also have other problems that I won’t mention. Do you think you can come and protect us?'”
It is unclear what his concern is based on. In fact, the only time Article 5 of the NATO Treaty—the alliance’s collective defense clause—was invoked was after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, when NATO members provided military support for the U.S. war in Afghanistan.
Macron’s Nuclear Umbrella and Europe’s Defense Strategy
In a televised address, French President Emmanuel Macron declared that France was open to expanding its nuclear deterrence capabilities to provide a protective “nuclear umbrella” for its European allies against Russia’s growing threats. Traditionally, this role has been held by the United States, which still maintains tens of thousands of troops in European bases. Macron’s proposal was a direct response to a “historic call” from Germany’s next chancellor, Friedrich Merz, who recently stated that Europe must prepare for a “worst-case scenario” in which NATO fails to provide security guarantees.
Echoing Macron’s somber tone, Donald Tusk delivered a stark warning to Poland. Citing memories of Soviet repression, he cautioned Polish citizens that if Ukraine falls, Poland could be next.
“I will repeat what may sound astonishing but is true—500 million Europeans are begging 300 million Americans to protect us from 140 million Russians, who have been unable to defeat 40 million Ukrainians for three years.”
According to Tusk, Europe has the means to defend itself but suffers from a critical weakness—”a lack of will to act, uncertainty, and, at times, even cowardice.”
Tusk’s speech came a day after a summit of EU leaders in Brussels, where they endorsed European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s €800 billion rearmament plan. Of this amount, €650 billion is expected to come from national defense budgets, facilitated by relaxed EU deficit rules.
The plan would allow EU nations to exceed the 3% GDP deficit limit if the additional spending is allocated to defense. Another €150 billion is expected to come from a large-scale loan program, though details remain undecided. A dispute has emerged over whether non-EU countries such as the UK, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey should be included in the initiative. Germany supports their inclusion, while France opposes it.
Diplomats in Brussels expressed concern that this disagreement could delay the program, pointing to a previous deadlock over a much smaller €1.5 billion fund meant to provide security grants to the Czech Republic. “We are at a stage where this must be resolved in the name of speed, not perfection,” said one European diplomat involved in the negotiations. “But if the €1.5 billion plan stalled due to French opposition, how do we expect to move forward with €150 billion?”
Von der Leyen, the architect of the plan, emphasized that its purpose is to enable Europe to defend itself independently. “Europe faces a clear threat on a scale that none of us have seen in our adult lives,” she wrote in a letter to EU leaders ahead of Thursday’s summit.
After securing backing for the plan, she declared, “History is being written now.” She emphasized that European leaders are “determined to ensure the security of Europe and to act on a scale, speed, and decisiveness that match the urgency of the situation. We are committed to investing more, investing better, and investing faster—together.”
